What is the “common good” that more people on the Right keep referring to these days? Of course, the common or public good is used to signify a wide spectrum of meanings. But let's talk about what it is not. In modern social science, stemming from its origins in economics, public goods refer to material things that are, functionally or practically speaking, able to be used by many without additional cost and diminishment. Paul Samuelson, for instance, launched a theme of modern economics when he said: “I explicitly assume two categories of goods: ordinary private consumption goods...which can be parceled out among different individuals...and collective consumption goods...which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good."
This is good. I was talking with a friend the other day about the redefinition of the common good by progressives (i.e., FDR, Dewey, Chase, Goodnow) who incessantly spoke of the "public interest." Their notion was essential utilitarian, and thus easily led to majority tyranny. E.g., FDR's Commonwealth Club Address where he divides "competency rights" from property rights in order to attack the private ownership of so-called "economic oligarchs" in the name of the public interest. In this manner the progressives essentially turned the common good into a divisive concept to be used as a cudgel against the enemies of "progress." Compare this to art. I, sec. VII of the Declaration of Rights of the MA Constitution, where Adam's defines the common good as "the protection, safety, prosperity and happiness of the people; and not for the profit, honor, or private interest of any on mean, family, or class of men."
The question I have pertains to the founders' reliance upon the natural law jurists like Vattel, who claimed that the social compact creates a nation as a "moral person" that has rights and duties under the law of nations via-a-vis other sovereign nations. I could see this idea leading to a collectivist justification of sacrificing a part for the good of the whole, i.e., as when a person voluntarily undergoes amputation of a gangrene leg in order to save their life. If the nation is able to function (and thus be held accountable) as a single moral and rational entity parallel to an individual, then why couldn't the common good be defined as that which is best for the whole and not any one part of the whole? Admittedly, this assumes an Aristotelian political philosophy that claims that the polis as a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. On the other hand, Aristotle claims in Politics 1261a15-20 that the city is actually more of an aggregate, since the closer it moves toward unity the more it becomes like a household and then a person (as in Vattel's moral person)—which is exactly what Aristotle has just finished arguing against in bk. 1 (that the city is not a household even though it begins with the family). Thus, I favor an aggregative notion of the common good: "common" must mean "good for all" and not just good for most, which would eliminate the temptation to sacrifice some (the rich, deplorables, white men, etc.) for the sake of everyone else. This would imply, among other things, that if the common good includes natural rights, then natural rights are commensurable and non-conflicting: in theory, it would be possible to protect the exercise of everyone's natural rights without anyone being harmed.
"What is the “common good” that more people on the Right keep referring to these days?"
It doesn't really matter since referring to such a thing makes one a leftist.
To be on "the Right" means to stand for individual rights, rights-protecting government and capitalism.
It has nothing to do with some collectivist notion of "public good" used to justify your leftist faction violating rights as opposed to an opposing leftist faction doing so.
This is good. I was talking with a friend the other day about the redefinition of the common good by progressives (i.e., FDR, Dewey, Chase, Goodnow) who incessantly spoke of the "public interest." Their notion was essential utilitarian, and thus easily led to majority tyranny. E.g., FDR's Commonwealth Club Address where he divides "competency rights" from property rights in order to attack the private ownership of so-called "economic oligarchs" in the name of the public interest. In this manner the progressives essentially turned the common good into a divisive concept to be used as a cudgel against the enemies of "progress." Compare this to art. I, sec. VII of the Declaration of Rights of the MA Constitution, where Adam's defines the common good as "the protection, safety, prosperity and happiness of the people; and not for the profit, honor, or private interest of any on mean, family, or class of men."
The question I have pertains to the founders' reliance upon the natural law jurists like Vattel, who claimed that the social compact creates a nation as a "moral person" that has rights and duties under the law of nations via-a-vis other sovereign nations. I could see this idea leading to a collectivist justification of sacrificing a part for the good of the whole, i.e., as when a person voluntarily undergoes amputation of a gangrene leg in order to save their life. If the nation is able to function (and thus be held accountable) as a single moral and rational entity parallel to an individual, then why couldn't the common good be defined as that which is best for the whole and not any one part of the whole? Admittedly, this assumes an Aristotelian political philosophy that claims that the polis as a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. On the other hand, Aristotle claims in Politics 1261a15-20 that the city is actually more of an aggregate, since the closer it moves toward unity the more it becomes like a household and then a person (as in Vattel's moral person)—which is exactly what Aristotle has just finished arguing against in bk. 1 (that the city is not a household even though it begins with the family). Thus, I favor an aggregative notion of the common good: "common" must mean "good for all" and not just good for most, which would eliminate the temptation to sacrifice some (the rich, deplorables, white men, etc.) for the sake of everyone else. This would imply, among other things, that if the common good includes natural rights, then natural rights are commensurable and non-conflicting: in theory, it would be possible to protect the exercise of everyone's natural rights without anyone being harmed.
"What is the “common good” that more people on the Right keep referring to these days?"
It doesn't really matter since referring to such a thing makes one a leftist.
To be on "the Right" means to stand for individual rights, rights-protecting government and capitalism.
It has nothing to do with some collectivist notion of "public good" used to justify your leftist faction violating rights as opposed to an opposing leftist faction doing so.
We need to learn to think again. We are coasting on the deep philosophy of the founders.